

Corporeal subdivides further into inanimate and animate, with animate dividing. The major distinction is between corporeal substances and incorporeal substances.

Boethius continues in chapter two by first narrowing the relevant sense of nature to substances (thus excluding accidents ) and then presenting a complete division of substances. In sum, "nature" is a broad term encompassing both composite beings and their causes. It is this last sense which is most important. The first and broadest definition, embracing both substances and accidents, describes nature as belonging to all things which by their being can be in some way or another be comprehended by reason: "natura est earum rermn quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt." A second definition, comprising substances alone both corporeal and incorporeal, describes nature as anything that can effect or suffer something: " natura est vel quod facere vel quod pati possit." A third sense, taken from the Aristotelian analysis of the motion of natural substances, describes nature as the immanent principle of movement : "natura est motus principium per se et non per accidens." Finally, nature can also refer to the formal cause which provides the specific difference: " natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia" (cf. 435 436 HORST SEIDL ture and substance.1 In the first chapter he sets out to define nature and discovers four possible meanings. He adapted the version in good style and verified the Latin quotations. for having revised completely this English version, devoting much time and energy to fit the text and the footnotes to the style of The Thomist. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION Boethius develops his definition of person in the Liber contra Eutychen et N estorium after a careful consideration of na- * I have to thank cordially Father Brian Shanley, 0.P. It is hoped that such a clarification will resolve not only the neoscholastic controversies, but also some of the contemporary problems. The purpose of this article will be limited to a consideration of the metaphysical problems concerning the relationship between individual substance, universal, nature, and existence. Contemporary discussions of person largely either continue the scholastic controversies or adopt a modern perspective from which to expose apparent contradictions in St. Both of these influences, metaphysical and theological, have engendered problems of interpretation and criticism. Thomas' analysis of this definition necessarily involves metaphysical questions because of the implications of the terms " substance" and " nature" and moreover it manifests the inescapahle imprint of the theological problematics which surrounded the issue (e.g.

THOMAS AQUINAS accepted and consistently defended Boethius' definition of person: "persona est substantia individua rationalis naturae." St. THOMAS AQUINAS: A Contribution to Recent Discussion* ST. Still he sate long time astonished / As in great muse, ne word to creature spake.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Definition of muse in English English dictionary One of the nine Ancient Greek deities of the arts To say (something) with due consideration or thought An act of musing a period of thoughtfulness
